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Systemic Cyber Risks and
Valuation, Innovation and
Implications1

Defense:
Strategic

Pythagoras N. Petratos2

The Economic Undertheorizing of Systemic Cyber Risks
A broad consensus exists among experts that cyberattacks are increasing both in number,
variety, and sophistication. Some cyberattacks such as phishing and attacks on critical
infrastructures are aimed at the whole of society and whole states, while others target specific parts
of cyberspace, such as companies and military facilities. The internet has produced vast wealth
and distributed knowledge in a globally free, open and borderless space. However, the economic
benefits of cyberspace are continuously threatened by the rise of large scale, catastrophic, systemic
cyber events. Such adverse cyber events could cause enormous disruptions to numerous systems
all over cyberspace. Some of these systems might not be able to recover.
Systemic cyber risks have been relatively undertheorized despite their importance. Despite
their importance, there is very limited, if any, economic analysis of systemic cyber risks. To
highlight the critical importance of systemic cyber risks, let us consider how financial transactions
are performed in digital systems. Financial systemic risks conversely, have been significantly
theorized and researched. A significant systemic cyber disruption of digital financial systems could
have the effects of a major financial crisis. In addition, a systemic cyber adverse event could have
existential consequences. There could be systemic cyberattacks on military installations,
detonating nuclear weapons that would escalate conflict and initiate war. Systemic cyber events
can constitute casus belli, due to their substantial impact. ‘Insurance against war by preparation
for it is, of all methods, the most business-like’ (Luce, 1891). Understanding, analyzing and
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researching systemic cyber risks and systemically defending against them can be the best way to
prevent costly outcomes, conflict and ultimately the possibility of war.
Therefore, our purpose is to better understand systemic cyber risks. This paper attempts to
address some conceptual flaws of cyberspace regarding the critical role of systemic cyber risks. It
focuses on the impact and in particular the valuation of the effects of potential systemic cyber risks.
Valuation is an essential and established element in theorizing the aspects of economics and
constructing a broader framework for the assessment of risks. This paper briefly draws analogies
from the financial sector and crises and applies them to cyber risk. It also discusses the limitations
to valuation methodology that externalities, property rights and liability can bring. To make the
analysis more applicable, we examine the value of IP cyber theft, innovation models and how
systemic cyber risks can affect the persistence of innovation and its dominance. Finally, we discuss
the strategic implications of systemic cyber risks for the private sector, the military, national power
and alliances.

Systemic Cyber Risks and Financial Analogies
”Systemic cyber risk is the risk that a cyber event (attack(s) or other adverse event(s)) at an
individual component of a critical infrastructure ecosystem will cause significant delay, denial,
breakdown, disruption or loss, such that services are impacted not only in the originating
component but consequences also cascade into related (logically and/or geographically) ecosystem
components, resulting in significant adverse effects to public health or safety, economic security
or national security.” (WEF, 2016)
In general, there does not seem to be a consensus on a common definition of systemic cyber
risks. Sommer and Brown (2011) find that the definition varies between the two extremes of
occasions of multiple attacks on insignificant computer systems, and rather rare events that have
been subject to criminal convictions.
Furthermore, there are other and major limitations to the set of existing definitions. Firstly,
it is necessary to define the limits of a system. Is the focus global or regional and national? Is one
referring to the whole of cyberspace or national cyber systems or Critical Information
Infrastructures (CII)? Therefore, the definition of the system upon which the concept of systemic
cyber risk is based is crucial. Usually the term ‘systemic’ refers to large scale, catastrophic events.
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Systemic cyber risks that could have an overall catastrophic outcome should therefore be
characterized using a definable whole system approach combined with calculable aggregations of
risks.
Systemic cyber risks feature some characteristics that can assist in better defining and
understanding them. (Mallery and Petratos, 2018). Cascading is a fundamental characteristic.
However, it is essential to not only assume cascade but also to analyze its effects. What initiates a
cascade and the transmission and amplification channels and mechanisms? It could be said that
cascades propagate due to complex and critical interdependencies. The system architecture and
the structure and nature of interdependencies among cyber assets define how cascades evolve and
impact systems. Interdependencies highlight the massive complexity of modern cyber systems.
(Mallery and Petratos, 2018). As the number of connected devices and related applications grows
exponentially, complexity and interdependencies increase respectively. Another characteristic
strongly related to complexity is the high degree of uncertainty. The compellingly dynamic
character of the internet contributes to the uncertainty (Mallery and Petratos, 2018). The number
of interconnected devices, applications and technological innovations rapidly change cyberspace
and increase the uncertainty. Within this changing ecosystem it is difficult to observe the factors
that can trigger a systemic failure and its transmission and amplification mechanisms. (Pederson
et al . 2006)
An additional methodological difficulty directly related to uncertainty is that there is hardly
any historical systemic cyber precedence and data. It is unlikely that there have been yet any
systemic cyber adverse events with cataclysmic dimensions.

However, there have been

cyberattacks with systemic characteristics, that have cost millions and in some cases billions of
dollars, As the sophistication of cyberattackers increase, it is likely to have more systemic cyber
events. It remains subjective and debatable which events can be classified as cyber systemic.
Nevertheless, a helpful method is to use relevant historical, economic, and other useful metaphors
to enrich the discourse and provide insight into cyber strategy and policy (Goldberg and Arquilla,
2014). The analogies with financial and economic literature are valuable for three main reasons.
Firstly, the financial and economic literature on systemic financial risks and crises has been
significantly developed, particularly after the latest financial crises and bears parallelisms to
cyberspace (Petratos, 2018). Secondly, the methodology of analogies between financial and cyber
has been successfully used before and applied to the sub-prime crisis and the Lehman Brothers
3
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event (Zurich, 2014). Finally, it shares similar systemic characteristics and evaluates the outcomes
of adverse systemic events.

Impact Valuation, Externalities, Property Rights and Liability
It is crucial to be able to value the economic impact of cyberattacks and especially evaluate
the value at risk from systemic cyber risks because this is an illustrative way to display the damage
that cyberattacks can cause Simple cyberattacks do not have significant impact and it is relatively
easy to value them. However, it is hard to provide an accurate valuation of large scale and systemic
cyber risks. This is due to the characteristics of systemic cyber risks. The complexity of IT systems
and operations, the complex and critical interdependencies involved in the propagation of
cyberattacks, and the high level of uncertainty all limit successful valuation. The lack of sufficient
historical data regarding systemic cyber risks is probably the biggest problem. Although there are
some related data points, forecasting the level of potential damage is difficult and ambiguous.
In addition to the characteristics of systemic cyber risks, there are numerous externalities
that make it even harder to value their potential impact. An IMF paper argues that ‘Cyber risk is a
textbook example of a systemic risk’ (Kopp et al. 2017). Indeed, many characteristics of systemic
risks are analogous to cyber risks, especially large scale cyber risks. These market failures include
information asymmetries, strategic complementarities, coordination failure, and externalities as
well as economies of scale, barriers to entry, and concentration of risk (Kopp et al. 2017). This is
a wide range of market failures. Even more externalities, such as herding, contractual and other
types of network externalities can be added to the list of systemic cyber risks. (Mallery and
Petratos, 2018; Petratos).
An enormous drawback to evaluating the value at risk from systemic cyber threats is that
property rights in cyberspace are not well defined. The ownership of information and the
infrastructure in which it is transmitted is often unclear. Anonymity remains an unresolved issue.
It is hard to identify the owners and distributors of information. The case of Facebook and
Cambridge Analytica illustrate this problem. Identity and attribution cannot be effective without
well-defined property rights. Furthermore, the problems continue with responsibility and liability.
It is not possible to construct a theory of liability in cyberspace without property rights.
Accordingly, legal implementation and criminal conviction are ineffective, as are remedies and
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compensation. Finally, without well defined property rights, it is difficult to correct externalities
(Coase, 1960).
More attention should be paid to improving the definition of property rights in cyberspace.
It is fundamental to the better valuation and assessment of risks. Without valuation one cannot
effectively prioritize and invest in systemic defense, share risks, create alliances, and in general
guide cyber defense policies according to the significance of the risk. “In contrast to many other
financial and operational risks, loss data on cyber events is either not available or not useable for
pricing cyber risk.” (Kopp et al. 2017). The availability of data and disclosure of cyberattack
information is not the only impediment, the methods and tools used to value (price) cyber risk also
pose a problem. However, financial analogies and their application to cyberspace can prove very
useful for generating systemic cyber scenarios. Systemic cyber scenarios are necessary to
understand the nature and level of threats and associated risks.

IP Cyber Theft and Innovation Dominance
Our discussion so far has been theoretical. It would be useful to underline it with a practical
example of systemic cyber risks and valuation by addressing innovation models commonly
discussed in financial analogies. A example that can be considered to share characteristics with
systemic cyber risks is Intellectual Property (IP) theft. Cyber IP theft incidents usually denote
large scale operations and impact. It is also a persistent threat. Some figures indicate that IP theft
can reach $ 600 billion per year3. However, this might be an underestimation or overestimation of
the real figure. There is a need for better valuation models and methods (i.e. Work Factor Analysis,
Mallery, 2016) to provide more accurate calculations.
There are numerous innovation models that can be challenged by cyber IP theft (i.e.
production at lower cost, quicker release of products etc.). However, we would like to focus on
radical and disruptive innovations. Both radical and disruptive innovations are on the cutting edge
of innovation. They are not concerned with imitative innovation activities, which generates much

The range of estimates was from $ 255 billion to $ 600 billion annually. ‘Further, while cyber espionage may have
decreased from some actors, several sources report that the worst and most capable actors still persist in hacking for
economic gain’. In The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property by The National Bureau of
Asian Research (2017). Update to the IP Commission. The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessment
of the Challenges and US Policy. The National Bureau of Asian Research.
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lower value. In that sense disruptive and radical innovation can be deemed responsible for
producing companies with extraordinary value (i.e. Amazon, Alphabet, Facebook, etc.). Moreover,
these innovations can create new markets, disrupt, completely change and eventually make
existing markets irrelevant4.5 In that sense, cyber IP theft that targets disruptive and radical
innovations can be a ‘game changer’ in many fields. Cyber theft of high value innovations can
undermine the competitive and strategic advantage of nations and change the balance of power.
Such innovations can, not only, affect markets, whole industries, national industrial
structure and innovation policy, but they can also have remarkably systemic strategic and defense
implications. A notable example is stealth technology and its implications for the Research and
Development (R&D) process behind defense acquisitions and strategies found in modern nations.
In order to develop stealth technology and the fifth generation of combat aircraft (i.e. F-35), there
is a need for significant investment. The F-35 multirole aircraft can be considered a disruptive
innovation, since it can render the earliest fourth generation fighters obsolete. The value of stealth
technology, and in particular the F-35, is hard to estimate. It is not only the investment in this
technology that defines its valuation, but a broader array of value elements, ranging from
intangible assets (i.e. related IP and diffusion of technology) to the strategic value of having unique
weaponry in strategies of deterrence, containment and air superiority. There are significant
indications that such technology has been obtained by other nations using cyber espionage
operations6. Similar cases can be true for naval and ground forces military innovations and
technologies.
In that sense, cyber IP theft does not only have severe economic implications for wealth
and employment, it can also have severe effects on the systemic innovation of states. It can
furthermore have security consequences that can threaten U.S. military supremacy and superiority
on multiple levels. Cyber activities and more specifically systemic cyber IP theft can challenge
military and national power dominance, specifically of the United States (Nye, 2010). Iit is

4
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essential to design appropriate cybersecurity policies. To do the latter, it is necessary improve
valuation methods for systemic and in general cyber security risks.

Conclusions and Strategic Implications
Cyber risks have numerous strategic implications. Systemic cyber risks, and especially the
example of systemic cyber IP theft, by definition, can have massive economic, technology and
innovation implications and bring changes to markets, industries, society and national power. We
have already discussed the economic implications and innovation dominance. A useful parallelism
lies between systemic cyber risks and the systemic theories and levels of analysis in international
relations. The value at risk and the potential impact of systemic cyber risks can significantly affect
the broader basic concepts in international relations. State sovereignty can be noticeably breached
by systemic cyberattacks.
National power, soft and hard, can be also significantly affected. This is particularly true
for smaller states, where systemic cyber events could substantially degrade their capabilities and
consequently increase the level of threats. In the long term, cyber IP theft and other potential
systemic cyber risks can change the balance of power between states. States can close economic
and defense capability gaps and sometimes leapfrog. Therefore, in a complex world, and possibly
related to other adverse events, cyber systemic risks could trigger frictions, cause conflict
escalation and in some cases might constitute casus belli. Finally, it raises concerns about alliances
and what a systemic cyberattack in a member state might mean and what reactions it would cause.
Systemic cyber risks require systemic responses and therefore a whole system approach.
The first step is to define them and better understand their characteristics and the value of their
potential impact. The estimation of the value at risk is crucial for appropriate prioritization,
investment and cooperation. Cooperation and the formation of alliances are usually based on
desired outcomes and thus the valuation of these outcomes is essential. Externalities can cause
significant limitations and property rights could assist in correcting them and improving liability
and legal implementation. Property rights are necessary for tackling cyber IP theft and most
importantly for defining legal actions, remedies and compensation that can prevent it. At the same
time, property rights are crucial for outlining national sovereignty. Norms can facilitate property
rights and assist in the avoidance of systemic cyber risks. Norms and legal rules have a systemic
7
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character (Kratochwil, 1989) and can correspond to the systemic cyber risks challenges. Norms
should apply to both economic issues as well as national security dimensions.
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